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The Recapture of Public Value on the Termination of the 
Use of Commercial Land Under Takings Jurisprudence 
and Economic Analysis 
Donald C. Guy and James E. Holloway* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a cleared commercial site that is being prepared for redevel-
opment in a city. Now try to imagine that a request for rezoning to resi-
dential use creates a loss of public value1 that supports the public 
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that: 
I. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes. Richard J. Roddewig and Gary R. Papke state 
[P]ublic value refers to a hypothetical contribution made by public authorities or by 
neighboring property owners rather than by the individual owner to the market value of a 
property. In this ... usage, traditional market value is higher than either the public or pri-
vate component and is in effect the combination of the two. 
Richard J. Roddewig & Gary R. Papke, Market Value and Public Value: An Exploratory Essay, 61 
THE APPRAISAL J. 52, 53 ( 1993). Roddewig and Papke note that a purpose of public value is to aid 
government in deciding to invest in natural resources. /d. at 54-SS. 
The existence of public value in private property or land is not a new issue. Paul W. Gates' com-
ments exemplify the issue: 
[W]hile the management of our remaining public domain is still a most serious and im-
portant question, the management of that portion of our territory that has become private 
property is a more serious problem. In fact, the old distinction between public and private 
is losing it sharpness, or is being eroded away, and for the sake of later generations it 
should be. Has a man a right to destroy good, irreplaceable agricultural land by covering 
it up with cement or strip-mining it? 
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policy of a development impact exaction2 to offset the public costs of 
administrative activities by the municipality to replace the commercial 
facility. This has actually happened and it could happen again. When 
private recreational facilities that produce congestible public goods3 are 
considered public ends that constitute legitimate state interests, the dis-
continuance of these facilities may exacerbate social programs to provide 
these local needs that, in tum, justify regulatory means to advance and 
relate to municipal demands for these needs.4 The social needs that 
would be affected are deficient public services and public inconvenience 
that result from the unavailability of these facilities for public use. 5 A 
public benefit that is enlarged by the opportunity for public use of these 
private facilities creates public value providing the justification for the 
Paul W. Gates, Overview of American Land Policy, 50 SMITHSONIAN AGRIC. 227-28 (Apr. 1975) 
quoted in TIM LEHMAN, PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE LANDS 4 (1995). Professor Lehman notes that 
"[i]f private land has inherent public value, how it is to be governed in a society that resists regula-
tory controls?" /d. Policy-makers, scholars, landowners and conservationists have yet to address this 
question in the preservation of farmland that is protected by federal, state and local programs. See 
James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Rethinking Local and State Agricultural Land Use and Natu-
ral Resources Policies: Coordinating Programs to Address the Interdependency and Combined 
Losses of Farms, Soils and Farmland, 5 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 383-91 (1990). Although the 
degradation, pollution and destruction of land and water resources directly alter our way of life, en-
vironmental qualities, and recreational activities, the public value in private farmland and other natu-
ral resources remain difficult policy-making by imposing forceful regulatory controls. See xenerally 
Lehman, supra note I, at 152-56. 
The question of public value in private property is made more perplexing when a court concludes 
that public value exists in a commercial enterprise in which local government grants a public benefit, 
such as changing its land use plan when the use of "private recreational facilities created a public 
benefit by enlarging the availability of such facilities .... "Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 
429, 445 (Cal. 1966), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 299 (1996). Yet public value in commercial property 
that must be granted a public benefit would permit local governments to request a regulatory fee to 
offset the costs of government actions and activities to secure a legitimate state interest supported by 
this public value. If there is public value in a recreational facility that is enlarged by public use, then 
government can request a regulatory fee to advance recreational interests that are supported by this 
public value. See id. at 445-46. This public value justifies, when federal and state revenues are de-
clining, the collection of regulatory fees, namely an exaction or mitigation fee, to assist in correcting 
the loss of public value caused by a private action, namely changes in the use of private property. 
See id. In contrast, some land use policies give cash and other incentives to secure public value in 
private farmland that is open space, a way of life and business. See Holloway & Guy, supra note I, 
at 386-87 nn.l2-30. Yet a mitigation fee operates in the opposite way. Landowners pay government 
a regulatory fee to diminish or destroy public value by changing the use of commercial land that 
negatively impacts legitimate state interests. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449-50. But if the cost of pub-
lic value greatly reduces the return on capital invested in the development of commercial property, 
this cost could eventually affect the market value that a purchaser is willing to pay to acquire land 
for development. See Roddewig & Papke, supra note I, at 60-61. 
For a discussion of tying compensation to government use of private land that it takes by eminent 
domain for public use, see Robert Innes, The Economics of Takings and Compensation When Land 
and its Public Use Value Are In Private Hands, 76 LAND ECON. 195, 195-212 (2000). 
2. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
3. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
4. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
5. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
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impact exaction.6 Although the public need is not generated by the im-
pact of the development of the demolished commercial site, public value 
is the ends connector or policy linchpin between the public need and the 
private action.7 This connector or linchpin validates a public need and 
thus enables an exaction to advance a legitimate state interest and to re-
late to policy justifications.8 The tenuous reality of this linchpin is that 
this value to the public confounds both jurisprudential and economic 
theories by permitting the discontinuance of some land use to support an 
impact exaction to further a public end.9 
A. Recapturing the Value of Public Association with Business 
Recapturing, or using the value to the public, of congestible public 
goods as policy requirements to impose a mitigation fee requiring the 
landowner to internalize some public costs for the discontinuance of 
commercial land use, raises both economic and jurisprudential ques-
tions.10 The jurisprudence of public value that results from a public bene-
fit derived from the public use of commercial property is not well settled 
under regulatory takings doctrine.'' Moreover, the economics of public 
value that support government action to preserve natural resources and 
private facilities by imposing legal obligations are not fully developed in 
economic theory. 12 These private recreational, parking and other facili-
6. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra Part V and accompanying notes. 
8. See infra Part III, Part V and accompanying notes. 
9. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 440-47. Ehrlich raises a regulatory taking issue regarding public 
value under the nature of government action. /d. at 445-46. Another state takings case raised a re-
lated question regarding the role of public value in determining the economic effects of regulation on 
market value. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 336 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (N.Y. 1977), 
affirmed on other grounds, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), in the context of interference with investment-
backed expectations of regulatory taking doctrine. The Court of Appeals of New York concluded 
that the return on investment from the Grand Central Terminal had increased because government 
invested in the railroad and infrastructure surrounding the railroad. The court of appeals noted that: 
Absent this heavy public governmental investment in the terminal, the railroads and con-
nected transportation, it is indisputable that the terminal would be worth but a fraction of 
its current economic value. Plaintiffs may not now frustrate legitimate and important so-
cial objectives by complaining, in essence, that government regulation deprives them of a 
return on so much of the investment made not by private interests but by the people of the 
city and State through their government. ... 
Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1276. In Ehrlich, the Supreme Court of California addresses an issue 
raised by public value directly affecting the nature of government action. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 445-
47. The city and state through the government made no substantial contribution to Ehrlich's com-
mercial site but wanted to exact money for public facilities. See id. at 445. The Supreme Court found 
that the public's utilization of this facility created a public value that justifies an exaction./d. at 445-
46. 
10. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
II. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra Part N and accompanying notes. 
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ties on commercial land can be similar or identical to public services and 
programs. 13 Many of these facilities are congestible public goods. 14 Gov-
ernment programs provide these goods under a social purpose that sup-
ports the redistribution of these goods. 15 A redistribution program "alters 
the state of the distribution"16 of those goods that were lost by the termi-
nation of a commercial enterprise. 17 A redistribution program alters dis-
tribution when it treats a private association or relationship between users 
of these goods and a commercial enterprise as public value connecting 
the public need for these goods to an unrelated regulation. Consequently 
it recaptures public value as a redistributive or distributive goal of land 
use policy, such as demanding a mitigation fee to provide recreational 
0 18 
services. 
13. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
14. See id. 
15. See Infra Part II. A and accompanying notes. Another view of the cathedral considers the 
nature of rights, interests, and relationships under law and economics. Eminent domain is a liability 
rule that permits government to take property, but government must pay the market value for the 
land under the takings clause. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liabil-
ity Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). Ehr-
lich is a limit on a liability rule and permits government to burden the property interest without pay-
ing. The Supreme Court of California limits a liability rule by giving residents of Culver City an 
entitlement, a public interest. These residents can exact money or a fee to pay for administrative ser-
vices in replacing a commercial business but are not subject to liability for exacting this fee. Their 
entitlement is public value that is derived from residents' use of commercial property in a market 
transaction. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 445-46. 
Obviously, the purpose of the liability rule that protects public value can effect wealth transfer and 
distributional goals, see Calabresi & Malamed, supra, at 1110, that effect the protection of a merit 
good, !d. at 110 I, namely recreational services, for residents of Culver City. Economic efficiency, 
distributional goals, and public policy must be considered in assigning a liability rule or property 
rule to protect an interest. In Ehrlich, the court held that economic efficiency may not be achieved in 
that the transfer to the residents of public value makes Ehrlich less well off by reducing his return on 
investments in the land and increasing transaction costs of development. See generally Calabresi & 
Malamed, supra, at 1093-95 (discussing economic efficiency in creating entitlements). Policy ra-
tionales favoring public value merely support inclusive public policy that requires developers and 
owners to share in providing and financing public facilities. Although it seems rational, one can also 
conclude that residents have a worthier need, namely recreational services. Obviously, the economic 
efficiency, distributional goals and policy rationales for resident-benefit public value justify more 
research to define emerging concepts of public value that recapture past public and resident contribu-
tions and benefits that municipalities purposely provide to private enterprise in infrastructure or ad-
ministrative actions. See generally Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434 (making both past and present changes 
in general and special land use plans for a site); Penn Cent., 336 N.E.2d at 1276 (providing public 
infrastructure and facilities for a commercial enterprise). 
16. Fernando Furtando, Rethinking Value Capture Policies of Latin America, LAND LINES, 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 8, at 8, May 2000. See also KENNETH D. GEORGE AND JOHN 
SOREY, THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES: THEORY AND POLICY, 68-102 (1978) (discussing the dis-
tribution of wealth and income under less than the perfect conditions in an economy). 
17. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434. In Ehrlich, the landowner demolished the recreational fa-
cilities that the government desired for use by local residents. See id. 
18. See Furtando, supra note 16, at 8. 
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Obviously an impact exaction alone is not sufficient to restore these 
goods, 19 but can affect government policies and programs that either pro-
vide or find a provider for these goods.20 These facilities, services and 
programs further legitimize state interests generally valid under takings 
doctrine.Z1 Municipalities can use exactions and perhaps other regulation 
to capture the value that the public contributes to a commercial enter-
prise. However, exactions recapture public value provided entirely by an 
economic relationship between local residents and a commercial enter-
prise. This recapture of public value should raise jurisprudential concerns 
under the takings doctrine. Namely, constitutional jurisprudence looks 
first to the source and character of the government action. When regula-
tion imposes a highly recognized public burden on an owner's applica-
tion for a rezoning and a building permit through an impact exaction or 
conditional demand, it implicates the Takings Clause in its efforts to use 
or recapture public value by imposing a public burden on the termination 
of the use of private property.22 
B. Takings Principle Limiting the Nature of Recapture 
The nature of government action factor23 of regulatory takings doc-
trine requires a conditional demand or exaction to advance a public pur-
pose and to relate to policy justifications. Specifically, under this takings 
principle, the takings test is a means-ends fit that scrutinizes the connec-
tion between conditional demands, public interests and grounds for a re-
zoning, issuance of a building permit or other regulation. 24 Acquiring 
public benefits by public use of commercial land could be commonplace 
in commercial land use,25 permitting municipalities to exact or demand 
uncompensated benefits. Therefore, a closer examination under eco-
nomic and jurisprudential principles is in order. 
19. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449-50; see infra Part N.B and accompanying text. 
20. See James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, A Limitation on Development Impact Exac-
tions to Limit Social Policy-Making: Interpreting the Takings Clause to Limit Land Use Policy-
Makingj(~r Social Welfare Goals of Urban Communities, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y I, 32-33 
(2000). 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
22. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
23. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. The nature of public value is not the only concern in exam-
ining the legal and economic implications of recapturing public value through regulatory fees. An-
other concern is the nature of the regulatory action that can be imposed on a landowner who requests 
a government action that would permit him or her to destroy public value accrued during the opera-
tion of a commercial enterprise that provided services similar to government provided services. The 
latter concern permits government to expand the regulatory and administrative means to further state 
interests, which may not be broadly favored by the public. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 429. 
24. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
25. See infra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
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Part I examines the nature of government action to ascertain whether 
a mitigation fee for discontinuing the operation of recreational facilities 
that results in a loss of public value to the municipality is requisite to ad-
dress the means-ends fit under takings analysis and economic analysis.26 
Part II discusses the purpose and policy of using land use regulation that 
imposes conditional demands that provide public services, programs, and 
infrastructure. It finds that conditional demands further public interests 
and goals, including recreational facilities, culture programs, and park-
land. Part III reviews the regulatory takings jurisprudence.27 It examines 
the role of public purposes and policy justifications in determining the 
validity of exercises of the police power to impose zoning, exactions and 
other land use regulations. Part III recognizes that public value is only a 
policy requirement to support the finding of a sufficient means-ends rela-
tionship. Part IV examines seminal federal decisions that review the na-
ture of government action imposing conditional demands based on public 
purposes and policy justifications. Part V examines the Supreme Court of 
California's means-ends analysis that includes scrutiny of a policy linch-
pin to find and validate the role of public value under federal takings 
doctrine. 28 Part VI examines the recognition of public value as a public 
26. See, e.g., James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Land Dedication Conditions and Beyond 
the Essential Nexus: Determining "Reasonably Related" Impacts of Real Estate Development under 
the Takings Clause, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73 (1996); Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, 
Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Government's Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
418 (1981). 
27. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922). In Pennsylvania 
Coal, the Court created the federal regulatory taking doctrine by concluding that land use regulations 
and other exercises of police power authority regulation may impose an unreasonable burden and 
thus take property rights in violation of the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. 
CaNST. amend. V. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-15. State courts have adopted the regulatory 
taking doctrine under takings provisions of state constitutions. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 389-91 (1994). They have also applied the federal takings doctrine in disputes that raised regu-
latory taking claims under both federal and state takings provisions. See id. 
28. One might conclude that an ends analysis under the nature of government action factor of 
the ad hoc takings analysis, see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124, provides proper scrutiny of the public 
value derived from the community's use of private property to further legitimate state interests. Pub-
lic value is neither means nor ends. In fact, it is merely a linchpin or connector underlying the pur-
poses and policy justifications for a sufficient means-ends relationship. An ends analysis under the 
takings clause would best determine the nature of public value that would permit an exaction to con-
nect to a social need generated by the termination of the use of commercial land. Obviously, the ends 
or goals rest on the validity of public value as a connector between public needs and private actions. 
The better question is whether public policy can have a proximate connection to a private action that 
merely changes the use of land but causes no harm or has a nominal impact on public services. A 
change in land use that is an antecedent for development can affect public facilities and services that 
are not directly caused by the impact of development. It is a usual consequence of a change in land 
use to affect public services that are regularly provided by government. Generally, changes in land 
use that precede development are not necessarily a direct or proximate connection to a decrease in 
public services that residents of a community want. A request for a rezoning may not necessarily 
mean that any development will sufficiently reduce open space, recreational facilities, or affordable 
housing and thus support a public need on which an essential nexus and rough proportionality could 
attach. 
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benefit when contained within a congestible public good affected by a 
legitimate state interest. Part VII discusses the public value of private 
property through examining the definition of public value as a compo-
nent of commercial land's market value that produces congestible public 
goods. It notes that recreational facilities are a kind of public good29 
promoting the public interese0 that may not be unique to recreational in-
terests31 unless the site of the facility is given a special governmental 
benefit. 32 Part VIII concludes that a mitigation fee assessed for the loss of 
public value must be consistent with jurisprudential principles and eco-
Any change in land use could and often does reduce the public use of private property, including its 
esthetic, economic or social benefits to the community. Just any proximate connection to a public 
service, say for example open space, should not necessarily generate a public need that would justify 
regulation. Simply, we are asking how municipalities determine public policy that reflects the politi-
cal direction of the community in providing for public needs. The Court might tread lightly here un-
til the causal relationship between public value and public needs is better defined in an analytical 
scheme that includes property, public policy, and takings law. The Court has been wise to leave the 
highest courts of California and New York, though decades apart, to say what is the public policy 
significance of a public investment or administrative action to the commercial development of land. 
We believe the linchpin or connector between this investment or action, such as a change in land 
use, and the public need could be an ends analysis because the public investment or action supported 
a past land use to provide for a public need. Penn Central's transportation facilities and Ehrlich's 
recreational facilities were given favorable public actions in providing for an obvious public need. 
For a discussion of the resurrection of a heightened ends analysis of social regulations, see Note, Res-
urrec·ring Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1363, 1379-80 (1990); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN I 07-145 (1985). 
Watching public ends expand is the norm of the Court, but all ends are not necessarily burdensome. 
The Court has not applied an ends analysis to protect property rights since the Lochner era. See 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Lochner era came to an end in 1937 in West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which sustained a state statute setting wages for women. 
However, the demise of the Lochner era had been foretold by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(I 934), which sustained a New York statute fixing the price of milk. In United States v. Carotene 
Products Co .. 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the Court made a distinction between property and economic 
rights and other fundamental rights and concluded that the application of substantive due process to 
scrutinize exercises of governmental authority in matters involving property rights and economic 
rights was too intrusive on legislative judgment. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. There-
fore, we focus on the use of a means analysis to determine whether an exaction can be used to de-
mand a regulatory fee at the termination of a business. 
29. See DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY 
TO POLICY 129-30 (4th ed. 1993). In economics, public goods are defined as goods whose benefits 
cannot be withheld from those who do not pay and are shared by large groups of consumers. Hyman, 
supra, at 129-30. They are not rivals in consumption, meaning that a given quantity of a public good 
can be enjoyed by more than one consumer without decreasing the amounts enjoyed by rival con-
sumers. See id. at 130. There are several types of public goods. See id. at 129-30. 
30. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 502; bur see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395; Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)(imposing limits of exercise of police power authority). 
The U. S. Supreme Court had recognized the right of states to regulate prices charged by businesses 
"affected with a public interest." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). In Nebbia, the Court upheld 
the authority of the states to regulate prices as part of the states' general powers to promote the pub-
lic welfare. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 537; see John N. Drobak, Constitutional Limits on Price and Rent 
Control: The Lessons of Utility Regulation, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 107, 107 (1986). 
31. See in(ra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
32. See Penn Cent., 336 N.E.2d at 1275; supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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nomic theories when the public benefit derived from the use of commer-
cial land results from an unavailable public service. 
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF CONDITIONAL DEMANDS ON LAND USE AND 
LAND 
Normally, such an internalization of these costs might appear as an 
aberration. But congestible public goods that constitute a legitimate pub-
lic interest are as common as the land itself. 33 Private parking lots, roads, 
streets, museums, golf courses, theaters, and open space share the same 
nature as recreational facilities. Thus public value derived from the pub-
lic benefit of using these facilities is common among these goods.34 The 
study of the nature of government action includes economics and juris-
prudence to explain the allocation of municipal resources affected by 
public value, to examine the commercial use of private property by resi-
dents to accrue public value, and to examine the burden imposed on pri-
vate enterprise affected by public value. This section discusses the public 
purposes and policy justifications underlying the need to burden private 
enterprise and effect the allocation of public resources. 
A. Legitimate State Interests and Policy Justifications 
Development impact exactions offset the cost of expanding existing 
facilities and providing new public facilities and infrastructure. Exactions 
include land dedication conditions, impact fees, linkage programs and 
inclusionary zoning?5 These conditions and fees finance public facility 
needs and public wants in many municipalities. Exactions shift the finan-
cial burden of public wants and needs to the real estate developers?6 
33. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
34. See id. 
35. John J. Delaney, Larry A. Gordon & Kathym J. Hess; The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Uni-
fied Test For Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees, and Linkage, 50 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 139, 139-40 (Winter 1987). 
36. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 20, at 28-31. Other "[n]ewly developed forms of exac-
tions are impact fees, linkage, and inclusionary zoning." Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements 
After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAW. 23, 24 (1990). 
These exactions are defined as follows: 
I .Traditional construction, dedication, or in-lieu-fee payment for site-specific needs imposed at the 
time of subdivision. These improvements are usually categorized as being "minor" in scope and cost, 
and are typically provided on-site. Examples include subdivision streets, sidewalks, trails, utility 
easements, and open space. 
2.Impact fees - more recent device to fund major, off-site infrastructure expansion imposed at the 
building permit stage. Examples include expansion or improvement of sewage treatment, facilities, 
landfills, primary roadways, schools, and active recreational parks .... 
3.Linkage- Emerging technique of off-site development impact exaction, imposed at the certificate-
of-occupancy stage upon large-scale mixed use or nonresidential developments, to promote social 
programs or policies. Examples include low and moderate-income housing and job training. 
183] RECAPTURE OF VALUE UNDER TAKINGS ANALYSIS 191 
Municipalities impose exactions to cope with social, cultural and other 
needs that are attributable to the impact of residential, commercial and 
industrial development.37 
Government actions that include both legislative determinations and 
adjudicative decisions are often evidence of new changes in social or po-
litical circumstances that effect local, state, and federal policy.38 These 
See Delaney, Gordon, & Hess, supra note 35, at 139-40. 
37. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 20, at 31-37. The United States Supreme Court applies 
heightened scrutiny to land dedication conditions under Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) and Nollan, 483 
U.S. at 825. Nollan requires a more causal link or essential nexus between the legitimate state inter-
est and the land dedication condition. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. Dolan requires a rough proportional-
ity that imposes a more direct connection between the land dedication condition and projected im-
pact of development. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91. 
Dolan is silent on the application of heightened scrutiny to other kinds of development impact exac-
tions. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-708 ( 1999). In 
Del Monte Dunes, the Court granted a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuitv. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 127 
F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 523 U.S. 1045 (1998), aff'd, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). In Del 
Monte Dunes, petitioner denied the respondent a site development permit after it made several appli-
cations over a period of five years. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S at 695-97. Respondent brought a Sec-
tion 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claim, alleging that it had been denied the right to receive just compen-
sation in violation of the Federal Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend V. Del Monte Dunes, 526 
U.S. at 698. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California submitted the 
regulatory taking claim to a jury and awarded respondent $1.45 million in damages for a denial of 
right to receive just compensation caused by the long delay in refusing to grant the site development 
permit. See /d. at 70 I. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. /d. The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that relationship or connection between the denial of permit and proffered justifi-
cations was lacking under the Court's precedents. See id. at 702. 
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court decided whether Nollan and Dolan apply to a regulatory taking claim 
where the landowner alleges an insufficient connection between the denial of a site development 
permit and the proffered policy justifications of the City of Monterey. See id. The Court concluded 
that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to regulatory taking claims that challenge the validity of a regu-
latory denial for site development permit and concluded that the reasonably related test was the stan-
dard of review for zoning decisions, such as regulatory denials. See id. at 702-704. Most importantly, 
the Court stated that Dolan's rough proportionality applies to exactions, See id. at 705-705, but did 
not state whether they must apply to adjudicative actions or legislative determinations. 
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court concludes that the reasonably related test applies to ad hoc zoning 
decisions, See id., but it was silent on whether rezoning decisions that impose conditional demands 
would not be subject to heightened scrutiny. A rezoning and issuance of building permit generally 
applies to one Jot or development. Treating this Jot or development differently under Takings Clause, 
U.S. CONST. amend. V, could create an anomaly. Applying the reasonable related test to rezoning 
decisions that impose conditional demands requires a loose fit between these demands and their pub-
lic purposes and policy justifications and thus would more likely validate the use of public value as 
public benefit to justify conditional demands. The same conditional demands imposed on the issu-
ance of a building permit would receive greater scrutiny and thus must have a closer fit where public 
value is the grounds for these demands. 
38. Many local and state governments are joining the Smart Growth Movement and propos-
ing and enacting land use and other legislation to implement land use and growth management 
strategies that combat urban sprawl, control economic development, control land use, protect envi-
ronmental and natural resources, and improve the quality of life. See generally ROBERT H. FREILICH, 
FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SYSTEMS, (2000) (discussing how to limit urban sprawl and initiate Smart Growth); AMERICAN 
PLANNING ASSOCIATION, THE GROWING SMART'M LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES 
FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE, PHASES I AND II INTERIM EDITION ( 1998) (dis-
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changes justify the need to protect the public health, safety, and wel-
fare.39 Social, economic, and natural circumstances generally require 
government regulation and taxation to provide public facilities, services 
and infrastructure. Financing infrastructure is difficult for many city and 
county governments as public capital investments grow much more 
slowly than commercial and residential developments and their effects 
on public facilities.40 Local governments finance the maintenance of in-
frastructure and expansion with local tax revenues and federal and state 
assistance.41 Local fiscal restraints, taxpayers' revolts, and greater public 
needs have caused municipal governments to increase reliance on exac-
tions to improve and expand infrastructure and public facilities. 42 Many 
local governments recognize that growth creates the need for new and 
expanded public facilities. New residential, commercial, and industrial 
developments result in an increase in traffic and population, the degrada-
tion of natural and environmental resources and greater demands for pub-
cussing policy-making, legislative and regulatory proposal and other actions to implement Smart 
Growth); Brian W. Ohm, Reforming Land Planning Legislation at the Dawn of' the 21'' Century-
The Emerging Influence of' Smart Growth and Livable Communities, 32 URB. LAW. 181, 181-210 
(2000) (discussing the influence of smart growth on legislative activities); James A. Kushner, Snwrt 
Growth: Urban Growth Management and Land Use Regulation Law in America, 32 URB. LAW. 211, 
211-38 (2000) (discussing whether state and federal law and policy support smart growth); 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS, SMART GROWTH: BUILDING BETTER PLACES TO 
LIVE, WORK AND PLAY, (2000) (discussing what smart growth means to housing and economic de-
velopment). 
Setting priorities for social goals appears even more challenging than in the past. Recent public and 
private initiatives in growth management and land use controls indicate new challenges in land use 
policy-making. State, regional, and local policy-makers must weigh economic development and the 
quality of life in the growth of municipalities and regions. These initiatives must find cooperation 
among businesses, conservationists, planners, developers, citizens and policy-makers. Municipal 
governments want to limit urban sprawl or unchecked development; revitalized inner cities and 
downtowns and provide for sustainable development. Likewise, developers must now consider the 
impact of commercial, residential and other development on the natural resources and the quality of 
life of the community and region, such as the city and regional watersheds. See generally William A. 
Johnson, Jr., Smart Growth and Regional Cooperation: A Tale of a City and County, STATE & 
LoCAL LAW NEWS, at I, I & 18-21 (A speech that was given by The Honorable William A. John-
son, Jr., Mayor of Rochester, (New York, at the "Smart Growth and Regional Cooperation" panel at 
the American Bar Association's Section on State and Government Law meeting in Kansas City, on 
October 16, 1999. Mayor Johnson discussed policy concerns regarding the way communities grow 
and develop in response to urban sprawl and global markets.). 
39. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
40. See, e.g., James A. Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a 
Condition for Public Development Approval in the Time of"the Rehnquist Court, 8 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 53, 53-55 (1992); James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice and 
Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 85-86 (1987); Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Im-
provement Requirements To Community Benefit Assessment And Linkage Payments: A Briel History 
of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 ( 1987). 
41. Nicholas, supra note 40, at 85-86. In Banberry Dev. Corp. v. Smith Jordan City, 631 P.2d 
899 (Utah 1981 ), the Utah Supreme Court noted that "[t]he conventional means of financing mu-
nicipal facilities are tax revenues, special assessments, and bonding .... " Banberry, 631 P.2d at 902. 
42. See Nicholas, supra note 40 at 85-86; Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 26, at 419. 
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lie services and facilities.43 Therefore, municipal governments shift some 
of the burden for public capital expansion and improvements to residen-
tial, commercial and industrial development, by using exactions.44 
Exactions are land use regulations that shift the cost of improving 
and expanding public facilities and infrastructure.45 This exercise of po-
lice power, rather than taxation, by municipalities shifts public capital 
financing to real estate and other developers.46 
B. Public Burdens on Public Enterprise in Land Development 
Municipalities demand exactions to hold developers accountable for 
the negative externalities of developing land for residential (housing), 
commercial (office) and industrial (manufacturing) uses.47 Public facili-
ties and infrastructure needs can occur on the development site, such as 
streets and sidewalks, or off the development site, such as sewer facilities 
and parks. On-site dedication conditions and fees require land and 
money, respectively, for public improvements or facilities in develop-
ment. Real estate developers dedicate land or pay fees to install water 
systems, sewer lines, streets, and parks.48 Federal and state courts have 
approved many on-site dedications and fees because these dedications 
and fees improve or finance public facilities that are a direct result of the 
impact of real estate development projects.49 
Off-site exactions require developers to construct, install, and pay for 
public improvements and facilities that are situated off of real estate de-
velopment project sites. Off-site land dedication conditions and fees in 
lieu of dedication are problematic, however. Often it is not entirely clear 
how a particular development project creates a public need for the im-
provements of off-site public facilities and infrastructure.5° Courts may 
not approve off-site exactions because they are not always connected to 
development impacts.51 Off-site dedication conditions and impact fees 
43. See Nicholas, supra note 40, at 88-89. 
44. See id. at 88. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id.; Crew, supra note 36, at 24-25; Smith, supra note 40, at 7-9. 
48. See Crew, supra note 36, at 24; Smith, supra note 40, at 7. 
49. See infra Part III.B and accompanying notes. 
50. See Crew, supra note 36, at 25; Kushner, supra note 40, at 107-120; Smith, supra note 
40, at 7-9. There are two types of off-site subdivision improvements. See Smith, supra note 40, at 5-
6. One type of off-site dedication condition requires that public facilities and improvements be ex-
tended to "land bordering on the edge of the subdivision, crossing it, or extending out from it." /d. at 
8. The other off-site dedication condition requires public improvements and facilities that provide 
capacity in excess of the needs of the development project. See id.; Kushner, supra note 40, at I 08 
nn. 281-282. 
51. See Crew, supra note 36, at 25; Smith, supra note 40, at 8; but see Ayres v. City Council 
of the City of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d I (1949) (approving off-site exactions for parks.). 
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may, however, provide positive benefits that also support growth and de-
velopment within an area of the municipality.52 
III. LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC BURDEN OF THE LANDOWNER 
UNDER TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee prohibits state and local " ... 
[g]overnments from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole."53 The Court examines the facts and circumstances of each case 
to determine whether use and other restrictions imposing burdens on 
owners' exercise of property rights effect a regulatory taking in violation 
of the Takings Clause, though there was no exercise of eminent domain 
power and thus no payment of just compensation. 54 The Court's "ad hoc, 
factual inquiries"55 focus on several factors to determine whether land 
use and other restrictions on property rights effect a regulatory taking in 
violation of the Takings Clause. These factors include the nature of gov-
ernment action, the economic impact of the regulation, and the extent of 
interference with investment-backed expectations.56 In deciding whether 
use restrictions on residential and commercial developments are an as-
applied taking, federal and state courts apply these factors to the facts 
and circumstances of each dispute. 
A. Limits on Exactions Under The Federal Takings Clause 
The Court has observed on several occasions that land use regula-
tions do not effect a regulatory taking if they "substantially advance le-
gitimate state interests" and do not "den[y] an owner economically viable 
use of his land."57 Thus, the Court has found that a variety of land use 
regulations substantially advance legitimate state interests.58 However, in 
some circumstances, government regulation of land use has been found 
not to serve the public interest and the regulation thus becomes a regula-
tory taking of private property for public use. An example, which took 
place in the genesis of regulatory taking law, is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
52. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 445-46. 
53. Armnrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
54. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); Penn Cent., 438 
U.S. at 124. 
55. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125. 
56. See id. at 124. 
57. Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
58. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (establishing urban zoning); Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (preserving open space in an urban setting); Penn Cent., 438 
U.S. at 104 (preserving a historic landmark); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Debenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470 (1987) (preventing subsidence damages by subsurface mining operations). 
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Mahon. 59 In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found that Pennsylvania legis-
lation forbidding subsurface mining, which mining caused subsidence of 
residences and cemeteries, protected only a private interest of the less 
fortunate party to an executed contract for the purchase of land.60 More 
than a half century later, the state of Pennsylvania enacted similar legis-
lation establishing a public interest in protecting surface structures from 
the subsidence, which the Court upheld.61 Thus, public interests do 
evolve or change with society, or as policy-makers become more sensi-
tive to changes in the finite resources and public needs that are subject to 
greater harm by unplanned development and other uses of these re-
sources. 
Notwithstanding Pennsylvania Coal's analysis to limit the expansion 
of public interests by burdening economic development, many govern-
ment actions that advance a legitimate state interest are not regulatory 
takings, even when such actions deny reasonable use or prohibit benefi-
cial use. Zoning laws restrict development,62 preserve open space and 
control urbanization,63 and require owners to forego other residential and 
commercial uses that are usually most beneficial.64 Other government ac-
tions restrict or deny existing beneficial use and even result in individual-
ized harm to the owner's property interest.65 These actions impose harm 
but are unlike zoning and other land use regulations that broadly affect a 
community of landowners who jointly share the burden and benefit of 
regulations. 
B. The Nature of Government Action Under Challenges to Exactions 
Municipalities often impose land dedication conditions and other ex-
actions on development projects,66 and developers have often challenged 
these conditions and fees as unreasonable exercises of police powers.67 
59. 260 U. S. 393 (1922). 
60. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. 
61. Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 470-474 (holding that legislation to prevent sub-
sidence damages by mining operations was not a regulatory taking.). 
62. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 396-97. 
63. Axins, 447 U.S. at 262-63. 
64. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137-38. 
65. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); 
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 ( 1962). 
66. Smith, supra note 40, at 10 & nn.28-37. 
67. /d. at I 0. State Supreme Courts generally did not hold that land dedication conditions and 
fees in lieu of dedication were ultra vires acts and illegal taxes. State Supreme Courts held that land 
conditions and fees in lieu of dedication were not in excess of state constitutional and legislative 
authority granted, expressly or impliedly, to municipal governments. See id.; Kushner, supra note 
40, at 124-25 & n.359. Other courts held that ordinances imposing land dedication conditions were 
invalid as unauthorized acts. See Smith, supra note 40, at 10, & nn.34-37; Thomas M. Pavelko, Sub-
division Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 J. URB. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 275 
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Developers alleged that imposing land dedication conditions and fees in 
lieu of dedication required developers to contribute more than their fair 
share to the cost of local capital improvements, which cost did not neces-
sarily result from the impact of their development projectso68 Courts rec-
ognized such challenges as valid constitutional arguments but did not 
find such regulation unconstitutional.69 Developers also challenged land 
dedication conditions and fees in lieu of dedication as not demonstrating 
a "direct and demonstrable relationship between the exaction and the 
needs of the subdivision development 0 0 0 " 70 Developers believed that 
they were being asked to bear more than their fair share of costs for mu-
nicipal improvements in the face of economic development. 
State and federal courts determine the validity of exactions under 
state and federal takings provisionso71 State and federal courts have de-
veloped and applied three standards of review:72 (1) reasonableness 
test,73 (2) reasonable relationship or rational nexus tese4 and (3) uniquely 
and specifically attributable test.75 These standards all require that a de-
(1983). When the state legislature explicitly granted municipalities the authority to make ordinances 
imposing land dedication conditions and fees in lieu of dedication, state and federal courts generally 
held that these conditions and fees were not ultra vires acts. See Ayres, 207 P.2d at 3-5. 
Any sense of relief by municipalities was short lived as developers challenged the fees in lieu of 
dedication as an illegal tax. Smith, supra note 40, at 15. Many municipalities chose to impose fees in 
lieu of dedication when a dedication "would be too small or too poorly placed to be useful to the 
public." /d. at 14. The fees in lieu of dedication required developers to pay their fair share of the 
costs of paying for needed municipal improvements. State Supreme Courts generally agreed with 
municipalities and held that fees in lieu of dedication were not a tax. However, some courts have 
held that the fees in lieu of dedication were "a special tax violating the uniform taxation require-
ment." /d. at 14-15 & 15 nn.58-64. With careful drafting and limited use of fees in lieu of dedication, 
the special tax claim was avoided by municipalities. /d. at 15-16. It is now well settled among the 
states that fees in lieu of dedication are unauthorized acts or illegal taxes. 
When ultra vires and tax claims were not successful in state courts, real estate developers challenged 
land dedication conditions and fees in lieu of dedication as unreasonable regulation in the exercise of 
police power. Smith, supra note 40, at II & nn.38-40. 
68. See id. at II. 
69. /d. 
70. See id. 
71. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 20, at 152-65. 
72. Smith, supra note 40, at 11-14; Kushner, supra note 40, at 152-60; Judith W. Wegner, 
Movinfi Toward the Barfiainin;: Table: Contract Zonin;:, Development A;:reements, and the Theo-
retical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 1017 (1987). 
73. Ayres, 207 P.2d at 6. The reasonableness or rational relationship standard gives the gov-
ernment almost unlimited powers, and thus is highly deferential to government regulations and their 
rationales. Smith, supra note 40, at 13-14; Wegner, supra note 72, at I 017. 
74. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 
U.S. 4 (1966); Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), appeal 
dismissed, 404 U.S. 868 (1971). The rational nexus or reasonable relationship standard is an inter-
mediate standard and requires a direct connection between the exaction and the impact. Pavelko, 
supra note 67, at 287. 
75. See Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 
(1961 ). All commentators agree that the "uniquely and specifically attributable" standard requires 
the highest level of scrutiny. See Smith, supra note 40, at 13; Blake & Juergensmeyer, supra note 
183] RECAPTURE OF VALUE UNDER TAKINGS ANALYSIS 197 
gree of connection must exist between the exactions and the impact of 
development on public facilities, infrastructure, and social welfare.76 
They differ significantly, however, in the closeness of the relationship 
between exactions and impacts of residential and other developments.77 
The least stringent test is the reasonably related test.78 The applica-
tion of this test or standard is mostly discredited by the Court's rough 
proportionality in Dolan v City of Tigard.79 It requires only that a public 
need exists for the regulation, such as exactions for public improve-
ments.80 Next, the rational nexus or reasonable relationship test requires 
a closer relationship between an exaction and development impacts.81 
This test is thought to be closest to the federal norm, that is, Dolan's 
rough proportionality.82 In applying this standard, state and federal courts 
require that exactions bear a reasonable connection to needs generated by 
the development, and not just public needs surrounding the develop-
ment. 83 Finally, Illinois and a few other states apply the most restrictive 
test, titled the 'specifically and uniquely attributable test.' 84 Under this 
test, "the subdivision creates the entire need for the new facilities and the 
fees benefit the subdivision residents exclusively."85 The specifically and 
uniquely attributable test is not preferred by the majority of federal and 
state courts because it is the most stringent standard.86 
These standards determine the nature and extent of the relationship 
between exactions and the impact of the development projects.87 Each 
standard imposes different burdens on developers and also permits vari-
ous municipal demands for public improvements and facilities. 88 Having 
26, at 429. 
76. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388. 
77. /d. at 389-90. 
78. /d. at 389. 
79. 512 U.S. at 391; See also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702. For the facts of Dolan, see 
infra Part V.B and accompanying notes. 
80. Kushner, supra note 40, at 156-57. In Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, the Court applies 
this test to zoning and other land use decisions that generally do not impose forceful conditional de-
mands for money or land. 
81. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91. See infra Part V.B and accompanying notes. 
82. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
83. Kushner, supra note 40, at 153-55; Crews, supra note 36, at 27. The reasonable relation-
ship or rational nexus test was formulated in Langridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board, 245 A.2d 
336, 337 (N. J. 1968) (applying the test to off-site improvements); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee 
Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 ( 1966) (applying the test to impact 
fees for educational and recreational purposes). 
84. Kushner, supra note 40, at 499. 
85. Kushner, supra note 40, at 159-60. The specifically and uniquely attributable test was 
formulated in Pioneer Trust & SavinRs Bank, 176 N.E.2d at 799 (land dedication for a park and 
school). 
86. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90. 
87. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 435. 
88. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91. Dolan and other takings precedents effect the standard of 
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a federal norm establishes a uniform burden on developers under the tak-
ings clause, but municipal requirements for facility and infrastructure 
needs that are legitimate state interests are not uniform. Moreover, mu-
nicipalities' relationships between social needs generated by develop-
ment and the exactions to offset the cost of these needs may not have the 
same underlying public policy that would justify the validity of a demand 
for land or money. 
IV. THE PUBLIC VALUE OF CONGESTIBLE PUBLIC GOODS 
Public value that creates the link between social needs generated by 
development and an exaction must have an existence, validity and utility 
in public policy and legislative policy-making that advances and justifies 
public purposes. Attempting to ascertain existence, validity and utility of 
public value, however, is elusive. It is difficult to sort out the issues and 
concerns surrounding the economics of public value derived from a pub-
lic-benefit contribution. Moreover, distinguishing between public value 
and private value of congestible public goods, such as recreational facili-
ties and parking lots, could be a problem of valuing a partial interest in 
land. However, the congestible public goods provided by private enter-
prise must have some value to the public. Richard Roddewig and Gary 
Papke in Market Value and Public Value: An Exploratory Essal9 dis-
cuss the issue of distinguishing between public value and private value in 
determining the economic value of public value. They find three differ-
ent views of public value: natural value, a segmented portion of market 
value, and option or contingent value.90 Roddewig and Papke, however, 
find severe limitations on the use of public value as a component of the 
appraised economic or market value of land that is often burdened by 
government regulations and demands.91 
A. The Nature of Congestible Public Goods 
More controversial is public value derived from the members of the 
community enlarging the use of congestible public goods92 that are pro-
vided by a commercial enterprise. In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,93 the 
Supreme Court of California concluded that public value can be derived 
review applied by state courts under state takings provisions. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 20, at 
157-65. 
89. 61 THEAPPRAISALJ.52(l993). 
90. See id. at 54-58. 
9 I. See id. at 58-61. 
92. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
93. 911 P.2d at 429. 
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from enlarging the availability of congestible public goods.94 Part VI 
gives the facts of Ehrlich and examines the Supreme Court's holding that 
applies federal regulatory taking law to mitigation fee underlain by pub-
lic value. Here, however, we explore the nature of the public value that 
the Supreme Court finds in Ehrlich. The case involved the loss of a ten-
nis club. We shall refer to this public value as a resident-benefit contri-
bution derived from enlarging a commercial enterprise that provides 
congestible public goods. 
Things like air pollution or a scenic view are probably good exam-
ples of pure public goods which would require collective action to 
achieve production of the desired level of the good.95 There is no market 
for these goods. In public finance theory, pure public goods are goods 
that are collectively consumed, are not subject to crowding, and are not 
excludable or are excludable at very high cost. A classic example is na-
tional defense. The degree of defense provided is a group decision which 
is made in a political process. The cost of providing for defense is paid 
for by general taxation and is available to all members of the society. 
Consumption by one individual does not reduce the amount available to 
other citizens. It would be very difficult to exclude someone from being 
defended even if they did not pay their taxes. 
Recreational facilities like those at issue in Ehrlich are not pure pub-
lic goods but are congestible public goods.96 Congestible public goods 
are provided for by taxation and are collectively consumed but the bene-
fits are subject to crowding. There is a possibility of exclusion and users 
of these goods may be charged user fees to fund their production. The 
city in Ehrlich considered acquiring the facility and charging a user fee 
for the club. The marginal cost of supplying the benefits to more citizens 
is close to zero until the system begins to approach capacity. Another ex-
ample is a road. Once the road is built, many people can use it. The mar-
ginal cost of adding additional users is low as long as everyone does not 
94. /d. at 445. Although the Supreme Court of California finds that the commercial enterprise 
is private property, it still concluded that public value does exist and is valid and useful in public 
policy-making. The Supreme Court stated that: 
/d. 
The assumption that because property is designated for private recreational use, it lacks 
public value and that its subsequent withdrawal has no public impact is flawed as a mat-
ter of logic. Although privately owned and operated, plaintiffs health club was a busi-
ness establishment, accessible to the public on the payment of a membership fee. The op-
portunity of Culver City residents to use such private recreational facilities created a 
public benefit by enlarging the availability of such facilities. Without such a facility, resi-
dents would have to travel further, wait longer, and put up with other inconveniences and 
restricted choices in their recreational pursuits. Thus, the fact that a recreational facility is 
privately rather than publicly owned does not erase its value to the public. 
95. See HYMAN, supra note 29, at 129-131. 
96. See id. 
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want to go to the same place at the same time. As more and more people 
try to use the same road at the same time, average speed falls and the 
danger of accidents increases. Portions of the system may be converted 
to toll roads if enough people are willing to pay additional user fees 
rather than pay the usual congestion tolls.97 
The recreational facilities in Culver City are an example of a conges-
tible public good. The Supreme Court of California was concerned about 
the impact of the loss of the tennis club because "residents would have to 
travel further, wait longer, and put up with other inconveniences ... "98 
This finding is a description of the costs of congestion as additional users 
are added to the system. The Supreme Court of California finds public 
value through a resident-benefit contribution that results from the resi-
dents in the community using private commercial property. However this 
public value does not necessarily compare favorably to the other three 
concepts of public value. 
B. Natural Value and Segmented Value 
Some scholars, commentators, and policy-makers advocate a move 
away from traditional appraisal methods to determine the value of land 
or real estate.99 A historic site or an environmentally sensitive area may 
have a value to the society that is not reflected in the marketplace. Schol-
ars have relied on Adams and Mundy who discuss the value of old 
growth forests as having a natural value to society that is not reflected in 
market value. 100 For example, once an old growth forest has been logged, 
it is lost forever to future generations. Roddewig and Papke, however, 
are critical of this movement away from the market. 101 They believe the 
problems of natural value can best be integrated into the appraisal proc-
ess by treating it as investment value rather than a special increment to 
market value. 102 The traditional appraisal concept of investment value in-
cludes the possibility that a property will have a higher value in a 
particular use or to a particular owner than it will in the market. Whether 
or not natural value is a valid view of public value, it does not seem to 
correspond to the use of public value by the Supreme Court in Ehrlich. 
The recreational club or commercial facility was not a facility that could 
never be reproduced on some other site in Culver City. 
97. See generally Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 448-49. 
98. See HYMAN, supra note 29, at 129-131. 
99. See Roddewig & Papke, supra note I, at 55-56. 
100. /d. at 55-56 (citing Victoria Adams and Bill Mundy, The Valuation of High-Amenity 
Natural Land, 59 THE APPRAISAL]. 48,48-53 (1991)). 
101. See Roddewig & Papke, supra note I, at 58-60. 
I 02. See id. at 61-62. 
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Segmented value is another concept of public value. Segmented 
value is the notion that total value can be segmented into private value 
and public value components. 103 Appraisal and economics deal with the 
effects of neighborhood and other types of externalities on the value of a 
particular property. The improvements might not exist and the land has 
little value if it were not for the existing public infrastructure, such as 
roads and utilities. The quality of local public services such as police and 
fire protection and local schools have an effect on the value of virtually 
all properties in the community. Actually separating out the public value, 
however, is very difficult. Roddewig and Papke do not think this separa-
tion should be done and raise the issue whether these values should be 
segmented generally. 104 This type of public value is probably closely re-
lated, but does not quite seem to capture the Supreme Court's use of pub-
lic value. The public value at issue in Ehrlich is the value that a recrea-
tional facility creates for the public rather than the value created in 
0 1 b h bl' 0 105 commercia property y ot er pu IC mvestment. 
C. Option or Contingent Value 
The third concept of public value discussed by Roddewig and Papke 
is option or contingent value. 106 In recent years economists, particularly 
natural resource economists, have done a number of studies intended to 
measure the value to the public of certain types of public goods for 
which there is no market. 107 Boyle and others compare means of three 
different data sets with open-ended and with dichotomous-choice for-
mats.108 Smith and Osborne also deal with methodological issues and use 
103. See id. at 57-58 & 59-60. 
104. See id. at 59. 
I 05. See Ehrlich, 911 P2d at 445-46. This issue of segmented public and private value may be 
"the other side of the coin" as the problem that the United States Supreme Court wrestled with in 
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. Pennsylvania Coal involved two private property owners who 
had a contractual agreement. See id. at 412. The state of Pennsylvania enacted legislation, which, in 
effect, voided the contract and left one owner's rights with less economic value. /d. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr., writing for the majority, stated that: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, 
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. 
But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due process 
clauses are gone. 
!d. at 413. Three quarters of century after Justice Holmes wrote that opinion, the courts are still hav-
ing great difficulty in drawing that line between reduction in economic value incidental to legitimate 
government regulation and a regulation that attempts to evade the requirements of the takings clause 
by imposing a public burden on private enterprise. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86. 
106. See Roddewig & Papke, supra note I, at 55-57. 
107. See id. at 54-55. 
108. See Kevin J. Boyle, F. Reed Johnson, Daniel W. McCollum & William H. Desvousages, 
Richard W. Dunford & Sara P. Hudson, Valuing Public Goods: Discrete Versus Continuous Conlin-
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the public's willingness to pay for improving or maintaining visibility at 
national parks as their example. 109 Other contingent valuation studies 
have been done to determine the public's willingness to pay additional 
taxes for other public goods, such as preserving air or water resources. 110 
Economic studies of contingent valuation may eventually provide an ap-
propriate methodology for measuring the value of the lost recreational 
opportunities from this literature. 111 
Thus, the use of contingent valuation may not be appropriate if there 
is a market for the good in question. For example, the citizens of Culver 
City, as individuals and as a community acting through their elected offi-
cials, have shown that they are not willing to pay for the services pro-
vided by the tennis club. The club consistently lost money when operated 
as a 'for profit' enterprise. This occurred despite several managerial 
changes, presumably looking for a profitable package of fees and ser-
vices. The city council decided that they could not afford to purchase the 
club to operate as a public facility, and they thought it would be too risky 
to purchase the club and operate it as a public facility paid for by user 
charges. 112 The council members apparently did not think that the citi-
zens would be willing to pay the cost of providing these services. 
V. EXAMINING THE NATURE OF PUBLIC VALUE 
UNDERLYING GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Public value that forms the link between social needs generated by 
development and the exactions to offset the cost of these needs must sur-
vive scrutiny under takings jurisprudence. The nature of government ac-
tion that applies mostly a means analysis determines whether the use of 
public value as the underlying public policy would be a conditional de-
mand for land or money. Takings jurisprudence requires these exactions 
advance public interests that were the purposes of their design to protect 
the public, and not give the public benefits without the payment of just 
compensation. 113 Moreover, takings jurisprudence requires that a particu-
Rent-Valuation Responses, 72 LAND ECON. 381, 381-396 (1996). 
109. See V. Kerry Smith & Laura L. Osborne, Do Contingent Valuation Estimates Pass a 
'Scope' Test? A Meta-Analysis, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT., 297, 297-301 (1996). 
110. See Roddewig & Papke, supra note I, at 54-55. 
Ill. See Rene rally Note, "Ask A Silly Question ... ": ContinRent Valuation of Natural Re-
sources Damages, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1981 (1981) (arguing that contingent values are too specula-
tive). 
112. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434. The fact that Culver City wanted the club as a public facil-
ity but did not have the money to buy it raises the possibility that they would try to acquire the facili-
ties in another way- through extortion as described by Justice Scalia in Nollan. See id. at 438-39. 
113. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
I 003 ( 1992) (holding that a land use regulation is a per se taking if it denies the owner all economi-
cally viable use of his or her land, though the government has proffered legitimate interests.). 
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lar degr~e of connection must exist between these exactions and the pro-
jected impacts of the development. 114 This jurisprudence analysis permits 
courts to examine the public policy that is set forth by the public pur-
poses and policy justifications of the nature of the exaction. 115 
A. Advancing Legitimate State Interests Under Public Policy 
The resident-benefit contribution 116 establishes a public value that 
supports regulation to advance a social need or a public purpose, such as 
providing recreational facilities. Public value creates a policy linchpin 
between a social need and a private action that diminishes availability of 
congestible public goods. Heightened scrutiny of the means to further the 
public purpose is necessary to determine if a resident-benefit contribu-
tion to commercial land is sufficient to exact a public benefit to offset the 
need created by the loss of the private facilities. The Court has yet to re-
view a case that involves a conditional demand based on a resident-
benefit contribution to support a public purpose. It has, however, ad-
dressed whether a land dedication condition can require landowners to 
further a public purpose that is a legitimate state interest but is not neces-
sarily advanced by this land dedication condition. 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Nollans leased and 
then purchased a beachfront lot in Ventura County, California. In their 
purchase agreement, the Nollans promised to remove and replace a small 
bungalow that was on the lot. The Nollans, however, needed a construc-
tion permit from the California Coastal Commission (Commission) to 
develop the lot. The Commission issued a permit granting the Nollans 
approval to demolish the bungalow and construct a new house on condi-
tion that the Nollans grant a public right-of-way easement. The easement 
was above the high tide mark of the beach and ran parallel to the ocean. 
The Commission wanted the easement so that the public would have ac-
cess to the ocean. The easement would not give the public access to the 
ocean from the highway, but would permit the public to move unre-
stricted along the beach once people were on the beach. When the Nol-
lans objected to the land dedication condition, the Commission overruled 
their objection and relied on the public need for access to the ocean. The 
Nollans filed an action in the state trial court claiming that the grant of a 
right-of-way easement on their land violated the federal takings clause. 117 
The California state trial court held that the land dedication condition, 
114. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91. 
115. See Dolan. 512 U.S. at 386. 
116. For public-benefit contribution by the City of New York that made a direct capital in-
vestment in a private transportation facility, see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
117. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829-32. 
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requiring the Nollans to grant a lateral easement, was a taking of private 
property in violation of the Fifth118 and Fourteenth119 Amendments. 120 
The California Court of Appeals concluded that a public need for access 
was justification enough to support the condition. 121 The Nollans ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision. It held that the land dedi-
cation condition required for the issuance of a building permit was a 
regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution. 122 The Court concluded that no essential nexus existed 
between the legitimate state interest and the land dedication condition 
imposed under the Commission's exercise of the police power. 123 The 
Court stated that beach access, though presumed to be a legitimate state 
interest, 124 would not be "substantially advance[ d]" by land use regula-
tion in the form of a land dedication condition that mandates the granting 
of an easement in return for a construction permit. 125 Although the Court 
found that the condition provided for lateral movement on the beach, 126 it 
did not find that this condition would necessarily make the beach acces-
sible to the public, when the public could not even see the beach from the 
h. h 127 tg way. 
Nollan addressed the nature of the link or connection between an ex-
action and its public purpose that generally furthers some social or other 
public need. 128 The land dedication condition would give the Commis-
sion a property interest in the Nollans' land and take their property 
rights. But the Public Trust Doctrine would not necessarily, without 
more, give the Commission's control over Nollans' right to develop and 
use their property .129 The Public Trust Doctrine protects public value in 
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause's guarantee states that "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." !d. 
119. See U. S. CONST. amend. XN. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,239 (1897). 
120. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829. 
121. 223 Cai.Rptr. 28 (1986). 
122. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42. 
123. See id. at 839-40. 
124. See id. at 834-35. 
125. See id. at 838-40 
126. See id. at 838-39. 
127. See id. 
128. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35. 
129. See id. at 832-33. The public trust doctrine gives the states ownership of all navigable 
waters and tidelands and other underlying lands within their borders. The states hold these waters in 
public trust for the citizens of the states. See, e .. g., Illinois Cent. Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 
435 (1892); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I, 79 (1821). The public trust doctrine is state law and thus 
may vary from state to state. See e.g., Illinois Cent. Railroad, 146 U.S. at 435; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 
79. For interpretations of the public trust doctrine by California courts, see, e.g., Mark v. Whitney, 
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the land below the high-tide mark of navigable waters, 130 but according 
to the Nollan Court, it would not create a public-benefit contribution to 
permit a lateral easement along the beach to advance a public purpose. 131 
Even close proximity to publicly controlled land that definitely possesses 
public value through its natural qualities does not necessarily create a 
public-benefit contribution that would justify a lateral easement. 132 The 
Commission's demand required the Nollans to grant the state a property 
right and public access to the Nollans' land. 133 In rejecting the Commis-
sion's demand, the Court found the nexus or link between the conditional 
demand for the grant of a lateral easement for public use and the public's 
need for accessibility to the beach lacking. 134 
B. Establishing a Sufficient Relationship between Means and Ends 
The public value of a resident-benefit contribution permeates com-
mercial and industrial operations and thus may apparently support public 
purpose when the policy linchpin between development and social needs 
appears even unlikely to exist in fact and theory. The resident-benefit 
contribution may lessen the need for policy justifications by permitting 
courts to minimize both the nature and scope of development impacts. 
The Court has yet to review a case involving a conditional demand that 
relies on a resident-benefit contribution to support an essential nexus that 
would permit consideration of the policy justifications for this demand. 
The Court has, however, reviewed a case requiring consideration of the 
policy justifications for a land dedication condition. 135 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 136 a landowner asked the Court to decide 
the degree of connection required between a land dedication condition 
and the impact of development on infrastructure and public facilities. 137 
The petitioner, Ms. Florence Dolan, operated a retail electric and plumb-
ing supply business on 1.67 acres of land within the City of Tigard, Ore-
gon (Tigard). 118 The petitioner applied to Tigard for a permit for com-
mercial development of her land. In the first phase, petitioner wanted to 
491 P. 2d 37 4 ( 1971) (enlarging the public uses of trust lands); National Audubon Society v. Superior 
Court. 658 P.2d 709 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (extending the public trust doctrine to 
non-navigable waters). 
130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. California extends protection under its public 
trust doctrine to non-navigable waters. National Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 712-13. 
131. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839 n.6. 
132. See id. 
133. /d. at 831-32. 
134. /d. at 838-39. 
135. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
136. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
137. See Dolan. 512 U.S. at 386. 
1]8. See id. at 379. 
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increase the size of the present 9, 700 square foot building to 17,600 
square feet to relocate her electric and plumbing supply business in the 
larger building. Petitioner also wanted to expand the size of her parking 
lot. In approving the permit, the Commission required that petitioner 
dedicate the property for improvement of a storm drainage system and 
for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. The two land dedications comprised 
approximately 7,000 square feet or 10 percent of petitioner's 1.67 acres. 
When petitioner requested a variance from those dedications, the Com-
. . d . d h 119 d I h . 140 Th C . . rmss1on eme t e request · an a so t e vanance. e ommisswn 
found that the dedications for stormwater management and the pedes-
trian/bicycle pathway were reasonably related to petitioner's request to 
intensify the use of her site. 141 The Tigard City Council approved the de-
nial of the variance and affirmed the Commission's final order. 142 Peti-
tioner appealed to the Land Use Board of Adjustment (LUBA). 143 Peti-
tioner argued that Tigard's conditional demands were not related to the 
proposed development and violated the takings clause. 144 LUBA con-
cluded that a reasonable relationship existed between the development 
and the public need for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway that provided an 
alternative means of transportation. 145 According to LUBA, these land 
dedication conditions were not a regulatory taking. 146 
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed LUBA' s decision. 147 Peti-
tioner appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon. The Court affirmed the 
decision of the court of appeals. 148 Petitioner requested the United States 
Supreme Court to review the case, and the Court granted a writ of certio-
rari.149 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon.150 The Court concluded that the federal standard of review for a 
regulatory taking claim is a rough proportionality. 151 The rough propor-
tionality standard requires municipalities to conduct a thorough finding 
of fact while requiring courts to apply a stringent level of scrutiny to jus-
tify the imposition of land dedication conditions and fees in lieu of dedi-
139. See id. at 380. 
140. See id. at 381. 
141. See id. at 381-82. 
142. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382. 
143. !d. 
144. See id. at 382-83. 
145. See id. 
146. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382-83. 
147. See id. at 383; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
148. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993). 
149. 510 U.S. 989 (1993). 
150. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396. 
151. See id. at 391. 
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cation.152 The Court requires that "the city make some sort of individual-
ized determinations ... " 153 in its imposition of land dedication condi-
tions. In applying the test to examine the nature of the government ac-
tion, the Court focused its standard of reasonableness on the nature of the 
adjudicative action, requiring an individual or site-specific evaluation of 
the projected impact. For this action, it requires a higher level of scrutiny 
that examines both the nature and extent of the impact of the proposed 
development. 154 Simply stated, a minimal connection will not survive the 
kind of scrutiny that is required under the rough proportionality test. The 
connection need not, however, be mathematically precise. 155 
The Dolan Court's rough proportionality test would permit the con-
nection to be minimized when the public purpose and policy justification 
rest on public policy that could prove elusive or speculative. Public value 
inordinately increasing the public burden of a developer based on a bene-
fit contribution that is readily present would need to create a clear line of 
sight between regulation and development impacts. When the resident-
contribution benefit is the foundation of public value that underpins gov-
ernment action to limit private enterprise, the public burden imposed on 
landowners should be readily justifiable. Such a public burden is not eas-
ily ascertainable from the definition of public value that exists alongside 
market value in the ownership of land subject to a public burden for its 
impact. 
Nollan and Dolan create a means-ends analysis that scrutinizes the 
link between the conditional demand and its public needs. The result of 
this analysis is a finding that public needs are legitimate state interests 
that are better left to the wisdom of policy-makers, but cleverly shows 
some ends sensitivity to increasing public demands. However, federal 
and state courts must decide whether the public policy underlying a gov-
ernment decision to link a business enterprise and a public need is within 
the link or nexus and thus permits consideration of policy justifications 
under Dolan. 
VI. A STATE COURT SCRUTINIZING THE NATURE OF PUBLIC 
VALUE UNDERLYING A MITIGATION FEE 
Recently, the Supreme Court of California was asked to decide 
whether the resident-benefit contribution underlying a mitigation fee to 
link a development project and recreational facility needs falls within 
152. See id. at 390-91. 
153. !d. at 391. 
154. See id. 
155. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
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Nollan's essential nexus and thus permits consideration of policy justifi-
cations under Dolan's rough proportionality. 
In light of takings jurisprudence and the economics regarding public 
value, the Supreme Court of California finds public value through resi-
dent-benefit contribution in the rezoned use of private commercial prop-
erty on which a municipality had relied to meet public demand for rec-
reational facilities. Its findings and conclusions of law permit state and 
local policy-makers to impose conditional demands on rezonings and de-
velopment applications to maintain social needs. 156 The impact of devel-
opment results in a loss of private recreational facilities that had been 
supplying a public good. These exactions are examples of municipal pol-
icy-making to assist in finding ways or programs to replace private rec-
reational facilities. 157 
A. The Loss of Public Value through Changing Land Use 
Municipal policy-makers have used exactions and other conditional 
demands to offset the cost of providing for an increase in public needs 
caused by the impact of development. Some municipalities find that ad-
ditional negative impact of development is the loss of private recreational 
and other services and facilities that had been supplying congestible pub-
lic goods 158 to the community. These municipalities are using exactions 
to assist in their administrative and policy-making efforts to replace the 
congestible public goods. 159 These exactions raise takings issues regard-
ing the initial link between the exaction and the social needs (public pur-
pose) generated by the development. If the link exists, the issue becomes 
the fit between an exaction and its policy justifications. Strangely, the 
initial link can rest mostly on a resident- benefit contribution that creates 
public value by enlarging the availability of the congestible public good. 
The case is Ehrlich. 160 In this case, Ehrlich developed a site as a pri-
vate recreation club. 161 In August 1988, however, he closed the club due 
to financial losses. 162 Ehrlich then decided to build a "30-unit condomin-
ium complex valued at $30 million." 163 In September 1988, he applied to 
Culver City to rezone the site from commercial to residential and to 
change its specific and general land use plans. 164 Culver City considered 
156. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 436-38. 
157. See id. at 449-50. 
158. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
159. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449-50. 
160. 911 P.2d429(Cal.1996),cert.denied, 117S.Ct.299(1996). 
161. See id. at 434. 
162. See id. 
163. !d. 
164. See id. 
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purchasing the site and hired a consultant to study the feasibility of pur-
chasing it. 165 Because the study determined that the Club had been poorly 
managed and needed major capital improvements, the City decided not 
to purchase the site. 166 In April 1989, Culver City denied the application 
for rezoning and other changes that had been requested by Ehrlich, 167 de-
claring that the loss of the club reduced needed recreational facilities of 
the community. 168 In the meantime, Ehrlich requested and received a 
demolition permit and demolished the club. He donated some of the 
equipment to Culver City 169 and also indicated that he would be willing 
to build four new tennis courts. 170 Later, Culver City agreed to approve 
the application for rezoning and changed its plans conditioned on Ehrlich 
agreeing to pay a mitigation fee (one-time impact fee) of $280,000 in 
lieu of building the tennis courts. 171 Culver City would use the fee to re-
place needed recreational facilities that had been lost to the community 
by the closing of Ehrlich's club. 172 
Ehrlich challenged the mitigation fee, inter alia, as a violation of the 
Takings Clause of the Federal 173 and California Constitutions, 174 claim-
ing that the fee was insufficiently related to the impact of his develop-
ment.175 The trial court held that Culver City's mitigation fee for recrea-
tional facilities was not reasonably related to the impact of the 
development project and was thus a regulatory taking. 176 The court of 
appeals reversed the trial court on the mitigation fee, 177 concluding that 
"[t]he mitigation fee was imposed to compensate the City for the benefit 
conferred on the developer by the City's approval of the townhouse pro-
ject and for the burden to the community resulting from the loss of the 
recreational facilities." 178 "The court of appeals found ... [that a ] 'sub-
stantial nexus' [existed] between the proposed condominium project and 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. at 434-35. 
172. See id. at 435. 
173. U. S. CONST. amend. V. 
174. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
175. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 435. Ehrlich challenged Arts in Public Places as violations of the 
takings clause of the Federal, U. S. CONST. amend. V, and California, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19, Con-
stitutions, as not sufficiently related to the impact of his development. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 435. 
The trial court held that the Arts in Public Places was not a regulatory taking. See id. at 435. 
176. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 435. 
177. See id. at 435 (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 15 Cal.App.4th 1737, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 
at 468.). 
178. !d. at 436 (quoting Ehrlich, 15 Cal.App.4th 1750, Cal.Rptr.2d at 468.). 
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the $280,000 exaction," 179 though the need for these facilities was not a 
result of the impact of the development project. 180 Ehrlich requested the 
United States Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari to the California 
Court of Appeals. 181 The Court simultaneously granted certiorari, va-
cated the judgment and remanded Ehrlich to the court of appeal with in-
structions to apply Dolan. 182 On remand, the court of appeals concluded 
that the application of Dolan did not change the outcome of its decision, 
but did not publish an opinion. 183 Ehrlich requested review by the Su-
preme Court of California. 184 It agreed to review the decision of the court 
of appeal and concluded that the Joss of public value was enough of an 
impact to justify the mitigation fee and thus this fee was not a taking of 
. c bl" 185 pnvate property tor pu tc use. 
B. Commercial Land Possessing Public Value by a Resident-Benefit 
Contribution 
In Ehrlich, the Supreme Court of California found well-settled Jaw 
infrequently used to support exactions such as Culver City's mitigation 
fee that advanced a need for recreation. 186 The Supreme Court, however, 
found a valid nexus between the exaction and development impacts un-
der Nollan' s analytical framework but relied strongly on protection of the 
public interest. 187 The trial court recognized that the public impact of a 
zoning change would not justify a mitigation fee to replace recreational 
179. /d. 
180. See id. Next, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's holding that the Arts in Public 
Places was not a taking of private property for public use. /d. The Supreme Court of California held 
that Arts in Public Places was not a taking of private property for public use. See id. at 450. The Su-
preme Court concluded "that the arts in public places is not a development exaction of the kind sub-
ject to the Nollan-Dolan takings analysis." /d. The Supreme Court found Arts in Places similar to 
traditional land use regulations, such as set backs, landscaping requirements, and other design condi-
tions and thus a legislative determination. See id. 
Ehrlich paid but did not challenge the $30,000 fee in lieu of dedication of parkland. /d. at 435 n.2. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court observed that development impact fees for park and recreational 
purposes are legitimate exercises of police power authority by local governments. See Ehrlich, 911 
P.2d at 448 (citing Associated Home Builders, Inc. , 484 P.2d at 606). 
181. Ehrlichv.CityofCulverCity,512U.S.I231. 
182. See id. at 1231. 
183. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 433. 
184. See id. 
185. See id. 
186. /d. at 444. In Ehrlich the Supreme Court states that: 
[P]Iaintiff and several supporting amici curiae insist that because the club was a privately 
operated facility, accessible only by dues-paying members, a zoning change withdrawing 
the parcel from such private recreational use could not have a cognizable public interest 
as a matter of law. 
/d. at 445. 
187. See id. at 444. 
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facilities that were truly for private recreational use, 188 and concluded 
that Ehrlich had no duty to provide recreational facilities to the City and 
stated that he had not caused the loss of these facilities by his develop-
ment project. 189 The California Supreme Court, however, observed that 
the government cannot impose a conditional demand to exact land or a 
fee and not have the power to prohibit development of the land. 190 The 
Supreme Court also observed that if the city condemns the land for use 
as a public recreational facility, it must pay just compensation. 191 Thus, 
the Supreme Court recognized that the public impact of the project is not 
its impact on public facilities but is the loss of private facilities that have 
been enlarged by public use. 192 We refer to this impact was a resident 
benefit-contribution that establishes public value was a link between the 
particular regulation and a public need. 193 
The Supreme Court of California concluded that private recreational 
facilities possessed public value and may impact public needs when re-
moved from private use. 194 The Court found that private ownership does 
not preclude private property from possessing public value but does af-
fect the value of the loss to the city, 195 and concluded that Nollan' s essen-
tial nexus and Dolan's rough proportionality apply to a monetary fee that 
"imposes a special, discretionary permit conditions on development by 
individual property owners .... " 196 The Court held that Culver City's 
mitigation fee was not a regulatory taking under Nollan and Dolan's ana-
lytical framework; 197 however, it concluded that the loss of public value 
in rezoning the site of the private recreational facilities club would not 
justify a mitigation fee of $280,000. 198 The Court concluded that Culver 
City could not use the loss of a private recreation facility as the lost 
value, 199 and gave the lower court some guidelines to apply in determin-
ing the amount of monetary fee that could be exacted from Ehrlich for 
lost value that resulted from rezoning and changing land use plans.200 It 
stated that Culver City could consider the economic costs (administrative 
188. See id. at 445. 
189. See id. 
190. See id. at 444-45 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37). 
191. See id. at 445. 
192. See id. at 445-46; infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
193. For a discussion of public value that is created by public investment in infrastructure sup-
porting a private facility. see supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
194. See id. at 445. 
195. See id. 
196. /d. at 447. 
197. See id. at 447. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. See id. at 449. 
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expenses) of redesignating other property or the public costs of attracting 
a new recreational facility,201 but also noted that Culver City could re-
quire Ehrlich to transfer the restricted use (recreation) to another site 
owned by Ehrlich or pay a fee in lieu of this transfer.202 
The California Supreme Court's use of resident benefit-contribution 
to establish public value permits municipalities to avoid the requirements 
of the Nollan-Dolan means-ends analysis. Ehrlich shows that even 
though an exaction is subject to Dolan's rough proportionality, a devel-
oper can be required to pay for public needs not even related to the im-
pact of the development. Ehrlich shows that a request for a rezoning and 
changes to land use plans can result in lost public value by the removal 
of private facilities from private use. Ehrlich points out that developers 
can pay exactions for the loss of public value for the removal of private 
facilities that were congestible public goods endowed with public value 
resulting from a resident benefit-contribution. 
VII. THE VALIDITY OF THE MEANS-ENDS FIT IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
The Supreme Court of California held that Culver City's mitigation 
fee was not a regulatory taking under Nollan-Dolan analytical frame-
work.203 However, it concluded that the loss of public value in rezoning 
the site of the private recreational facilities club would not justify a miti-
gation fee of $280,000.204 The Court concluded that Culver City could 
not use the loss of a private recreation facility as the lost value,205 and 
gave the lower court some guidelines to apply in determining the amount 
of monetary fee that could be exacted from Ehrlich for lost value that re-
sulted from rezoning and changing land use plans?06 It stated that Culver 
City could consider the economic costs (administrative expenses) of re-
designating other property or the public costs of attracting a new recrea-
tional facility, 207 and also noted that Culver City could require Ehrlich to 
transfer the restricted use (recreation) to another site owned by Ehrlich or 
pay a fee in lieu of this transfer.208 In essence, the Court concluded that a 
201. See id. The Supreme Court of California is permitting municipalities to force developers 
and land owners to internalize the public cost of public decision making to replace congestible pub-
lic goods. Normally municipalities use exactions to force developers to internalize the cost of public 
facilities and infrastructure. Municipalities are using public value to link public needs to changes in 
commercial land use and to burdens on government to address the decline of commercial centers. 
202. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449. 
203. See id. at 447. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. 
206. See id. at 449. 
207. See id. 
208. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449. Ehrlich also addressed whether Dolan applies to legislative 
determinations. The United States Supreme Court has refused to address this question. See Parking 
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loss of public value has administrative costs or obligations?09 Thus, 
while the Court assigned economic value to Culver City's loss of public 
value210 and implicated economic theory, its rationale does not support 
such theory in these circumstances of Ehrlich? 11 
A. Rough Proportionality Between Exactions and Social Needs 
Not all public value conferred on a landowner by the public 
enlargement of his or her facilities necessarily justifies a public burden to 
provide fees for administrative services. In Ehrlich, Justice Kennard's 
dissent does not refer to congestible public goods, but does make some 
interesting points that implicate a theory of congestible public goods,212 
stating that if the citizens of Culver City were suffering the effects of 
congestion in public recreation facilities before Ehrlich closed his club, 
this shortage of facilities could not possibly have been his fault. 213 Justice 
Kennard pointed out that this is not a typical development impact fee im-
posed on new development.214 If the townhouses that Ehrlich wanted to 
build were to bring new families to Culver City, this would further con-
gest public recreational facilities and justify an impact fee. 215 However, 
Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 115 
S.Ct. 2268 (1995). In a dissent to this denial of certiorari, Justices O'Connor and Thomas argued 
that the Supreme Court deliberately permitted confusion in federal and state courts' review of land 
use regulations. ld. at 2268. Other federal and state courts have addressed this question but are split 
on its outcome. See, e.f?., Shultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (applying 
to legislative determinations); Southeast Cass Water Resource Dist. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 
527 N.W. 2d 884 (N.D. 1995) (does not apply to legislative determinations). Finally in Del Monte 
Dunes, the Court concludes that Dolan and Nollan do not apply to general land use decisions that 
deny development permits. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 687. Federal and state courts do not agree 
on the nature of the decision-making process that is subject to the Nollan-Dolan analytical frame-
work. 
Dolan has generated many comments regarding its doctrine and application in law review 
and bar journals. Commentators agree that Dolan limits state and local governments' use of land 
dedication conditions imposed on the application of a building or construction permit. See e.f?., Hol-
loway & Guy, supra note 26, at 73; Kristen P. Sosnosky, Dolan: The Sequel to Nollan 's Essential 
Nexus For Ref?ulatory Takinf?s, 73 N. C. L. REV. 1677 (1995). Commentators do not agree on 
whether or not Dolan's rough proportionality applies to legislative determinations and development 
impact exactions. See, e.f?., Daniel A. Crane, Poor Relations: ReKulatory TakinK After Dolan, 63 U. 
CHI L. REV. 199 (1996); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, Supreme Court Solves the Taking~ Puzzle, 19 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. Pot.'Y 147 (1995); . Other commentators see Dolan as the dawning of a new era 
in limiting economic regulation. See Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Do-
lan, 15 N. ILL. L. REV. 479 (1995). 
209. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 449-50. 
210. See id. 
211. See supra Part IV and accompanying notes. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text 
(discussing a finding of public value in a private transportation facility that was greatly enhanced by 
government). 
212. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 466-68 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
213. See id. at 466-67 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
214. Jd. 
215. See id. at 466 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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the new development was assessed a parkland fee of $30,000 which Ehr-
lich paid without protest.216 With the payment of this fee, Ehrlich was 
paying the cost of adding recreational services resulting from the new 
development. Thus, the mitigation fee was really being imposed on the 
closing of the tennis club (the former land use).217 
The Supreme Court relied on a statement by Justice Scalia in Nol-
lan218 to describe how to determine whether there was an essential nexus 
in that case; Justice Scalia wrote, "[i]n short, unless the permit condition 
serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the 
building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an out-and-
out plan of extortion."219 The Supreme Court pointed out that the essen-
tial nexus was achieved here because requiring Ehrlich to continue in the 
recreational club business at that site served the same function as the 
mitigation fee. 220 Justice Kennard, however, disagreed and noted that re-
quiring Ehrlich to remain in the private recreational club business on that 
site might violate the second part of the test from Agins v. City of Tibu-
ron.221 This requirement could have the effect of denying all economi-
cally viable use of the land. Even if it did not deny all economically vi-
able use, it could still constitute illegal spot zoning which "occurs where 
a small parcel is restricted and given lesser rights than the surrounding 
property .... ,"222 and the effect of this spot zoning in this situation is to 
single out an individual landowner to bear a disproportionate burden in 
providing for the recreational needs of the city. 
In conclusion, the fundamental policy of American takings jurispru-
dence is that the Takings Clause " ... bar[s] government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole."223 Ehrlich was made the 
provider of recreational facilities because the public unknowingly creates 
public value through a most common resident benefit-contribution by us-
ing his commercial facility. Therefore, Justice Kennard would find the 
mitigation fee to be a regulatory taking of property. 224 
216. /d. (Kennard, J ., dissenting). 
217. Seeid.at434-35. 
218. /d. at 445 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.). 
219. /d. 
220. See id. at 445-46. 
221. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
222. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 467-68 (Kennard, J ., dissenting). 
223. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
224. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 467-68 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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B. Mitigation Fee or Exit Fee under Police Power 
To the extent that the mitigation fee is assessed against the closing of 
the existing land use, this fee could be viewed as an exit fee. Appraisal 
theory requires that a land use be legally permitted before it can be con-
sidered to be the highest and best use for a parcel of land. 225 In Ehrlich, 
the question of highest and best use will inevitably become mired in ask-
ing whether a regulatory taking occurs due to the nature of government 
action.226 However, in economic theory, a production process would be 
considered inefficient if the same inputs could be used to produce higher 
valued output.227 In this sense, retaining the site as a private recreation 
club would be inefficient compared to the development of the condo-
miniums on this site. This retention would utilize the same land, but not 
exactly the same inputs. Many economists consider that any barrier to 
shifting inputs in production processes, such as a barrier to exit, would 
produce less efficient allocations and result in a welfare loss to society.228 
Failure to permit a firm that is losing money to go out of business 
has other legal and economic implications. Public utilities have been and 
still are more regulated than other industries because they generally af-
fect legitimate state interests regarding energy usage and economic pro-
ductivity.229 As the United States Supreme Court stated in Munn v. Illi-
nots, 
When the owner of property devotes it to a use in which the public has 
an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in such use, and 
must, to the extent of that interest, submit to be controlled by the pub-
lic, for the common good, as long as he maintains the use. He may 
. hd h" b d" . . h 230 wit raw IS grant y 1scontmumg t e use. · 
Even industries regulated as public utilities could escape regulation 
by going out of business. 231 While the Supreme Court of California, in 
Ehrlich, may have significantly broadened the scope of regulation or ex-
panded the range of firms that can be regulated in the same manner as 
225. See Roddewig & Papke, supra note I, at 54. 
226. See supra Part V.A and accompanying notes. 
227. See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICRO ECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND 
EXTENSIONS, The Dryden Press 520-22 (2d. ed. 1977) (discussing efficiency in the use of resources 
in production); RICHARD A. LIPSEY, ECONOMICS 203-04 (2d. ed. 1996) (discussing economic effi-
ciency and technical efficiency in the allocation of resources). 
228. See, e.g., Nicholson, supra note 229, at 520-21. 
229. See John N. Drobak, supra note 30, at 107-09. 
230. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 126. See also Drobak, supra note 30, at 119-38 (discussing the con-
stitutionality withdrawal from price-controlled business and government-imposed barriers to exit). 
231. See Drobak, supra note 30, at 119-23. 
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utilities, public utility law is currently undergoing substantial change and 
we will leave this aspect of the case for future investigation.232 
C. Conditional Demands on Rezoning or Development 
Ehrlich is confusing with respect to the use of regulatory fees in land 
use regulation. In Ehrlich, Justice Kennard, writing for the dissent, 
pointed out that the mitigation fee focuses on the former land use rather 
than the proposed new development.233 This raises another issue in that 
the fee may, in effect, be a fee for rezoning rather than a development 
impact fee. The Supreme Court, however, seemed to treat these questions 
interchangeably,234 noting that cities have been allowed considerable 
discretion in zoning issues.235 However, the Court has recently raised the 
level of scrutiny required and shifted the burden of proof in cases .nvolv-
ing some conditional demands that are imposed by adjudicative ac-
tions.236 
In Ehrlich, the Supreme Court of California does not clearly state 
whether it would require the same level of scrutiny for a mitigation fee 
imposed directly on a rezoning237 or whether Culver City could enact an 
ordinance demanding a mitigation fee for a rezoning or change in land 
use.
238 However, any rezoning, even though desirable on other grounds, 
must take something away from the public. For example, a housing com-
plex built on open land in a city with a housing shortage might be very 
232. For a discussion of some of the market concerns and policy issues in the deregulation of 
public utilities, see generally James M. Hogan, Robert Neyland, & E. Mark Gressle, New Strategy 
for a New Era, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Sep. 15, 1999, at 10-12 (discussing the growth of 
utility companies during deregulation); Adam D. Thierer, Ener!{izing America: A Blueprint For De· 
re!{ulatin!{ The Electricity Market, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1100, January 23, 
1997 (discussing deregulation of electricity markets); Leigh A. Riddick, Deref?ulatin!{ Fairly: Un-
tanJ?linK the Interests of Stockholders and Customers, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, 41, at 41-42, 
April 15, 1995 (discussing a method to protect the interests of stockholders and ratepayers). 
233. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 462 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
234. See id. at 449. The Supreme Court states that "[r]ather, the city insists on a different kind 
of exaction as a condition for authorizing development: the payment of $280,000." !d. at 443. Later 
it states that "[t]his is not to say, however, that some type of recreational fee imposed by the city as a 
condition of the zoning and related changes cannot be justified." /d. at 449. Moreover, in its finding 
of fact the Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals stated that "'[t]he mitigation fee was im-
posed to compensate the City for the benefit conferred on the developer by the City's approval of the 
townhome project and for the burden to the community resulting from the loss of recreational facili-
ties."' !d. at 436, quoted in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 ( 1993)). 
235. See id. at 439 & 447. 
236. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391-93. 
237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of California recognizes 
zoning and rezoning as a legislative action, see Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 447-48, but it refuses to apply 
Dolan to legislative determinations that impose exactions. See id. at 450. 
238. See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court concludes that Do· 
fan does not apply to the Arts in Public Places fee because this fee is merely a traditional legislative 
determination. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 450. 
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desirable generally, but it does take away open space and perhaps poten-
tial farmland when it provides an even greater benefit.239 
Imposing conditions on the use of the land during a rezoning also 
raises the question of contract zoning.240 In Ehrlich, Culver City, in ef-
fect, told the developer that they did not have to grant his request to re-
zone, but that it might rezone for the requested use Ehrlich would pro-
vide the City with four tennis courts.241 Not surprisingly, Ehrlich did not 
like the deal and sued.242 If an agreement had been reached, however, the 
agreement would be considered contract zoning.243 The validity of con-
tract zoning is mixed among the states and some have found it an invalid 
exercise of police power authority.244 Contract zoning is often considered 
inappropriate because it amounts to bargaining away the police power.245 
In expressing the illegality of contract zoning, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina stated that: 
The Court of Appeals held ... that the rezoning in question also consti-
tuted illegal "contract zoning" and was therefore also void for that al-
ternative reason. Here, stated the Court of Appeals, the rezoning was 
accomplished upon the assurance that Mr. Clapp would submit an ap-
plication for a conditional use permit specifying that he would use the 
property only in a certain manner. The Court of Appeals concluded 
that, in essence, the rezoning here was accomplished through a bargain 
between the applicant and the Board rather than through a proper and 
valid exercise of Guilford County's legislative discretion. According to 
the Court of Appeals, this activity constituted illegal 'contract zoning' 
and was therefore void. 246 
While contract zoning is generally not favored in the courts, econo-
mists, legal scholars, and commentators generally agree that a market 
based solution to some rezoning and development problems would be 
preferable in many communities.247 Professor William Fischel treats con-
tract zoning in a law and economics framework and has concluded that a 
more efficient solution can be used for problems like the ones presented 
in Ehrlich if the private landowner and the city could negotiate a solution 
239. See generally Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (planning to build houses on ocean front 
property); A!iins, 447 U.S. at 255 (planning to build houses intensively on open land). 
240. See Shelley R. Saxer, Planninli Gain, Exactions, and Impact Fees: A Comparative Study 
of Planning Law in En!iland, Wales, and the United States, 32 URB. LAW. 21, 62-63 (2000); See 
Wegner, supra note 72, at 977-82. 
241. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 434-35. 
242. See id. at 435. 
243. See Saxer, supra note 240, at 62-63; Wegner, supra note 72, at 978-80. 
244. See Saxer, supra note 240, at 60-64; Wegner, supra note 72, at 982-86. 
245. See Saxer, supra note 240, at 60-64; Wegner, supra note 72, at 982-83. 
246. Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 616, 370 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1988). 
247. See infra notes 258-259 and accompanying text. 
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that would be satisfactory to both parties. 248 Professor Judith Wegner 
investigates the background of contract, conditional or contingent zoning 
to understand how municipalities and developers can find solutions to 
disputes regarding these types of zoning.249 Fischel, Wegner and other 
commentators find merit in market-based solutions such as development 
agreements that can be established to protect and preserve the interests of 
the community and landowners.250 
The mitigation fee attaches to the development, though it follows 
closely on the process of rezoning.251 In Ehrlich, Culver City rejected 
the application for rezoning and other changes that had been requested 
by Ehrlich. 252 It declared that the loss of the club reduced needed recrea-
tional facilities of the community.253 In the meantime, Ehrlich requested 
and received a demolition permit and demolished the club. He donated 
some of the equipment to Culver City.254 He also indicated that he would 
be willing to build four new tennis courts.255 Later, Culver City agreed to 
approve the application for rezoning and change its plans conditioned on 
Ehrlich agreeing to pay a mitigation fee (one-time impact fee) of 
$280,000 in lieu of building the tennis courts.256 Culver City would use 
the fee to replace needed recreational facilities that had been lost to the 
community by the closing of Ehrlich's club.257 However, the Supreme 
Court of California's conclusion that the public value of the resident-
benefit contribution existed in rezoned private property that was used by 
the public has little to do with development and more to do with a change 
in land use. 
Courts would be wise to limit Ehrlich to development disputes where 
the municipality had previously made a substantial change and is now 
requested to consider another substantial change to its comprehensive 
land use plan that may affect availability, use and need for public facili-
ties, infrastructure, and social services.258 Earlier variances and excep-
248. WD..LIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS 
APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS, 75-76 ( 1985). 
249. See Wegner, supra note 72, at 958-75. 
250. See Saxer, supra note 240, at 58-70. 
251. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 




256. /d. at 434-35. 
257. /d. at 435. 
258. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 433-34 & 448. See also Saxer, supra note 240, at 62 & n.278 
(citing Wegner, supra note 72, at 992). We note that imposing conditional demands that require a 
change in general and special land use plans that later cannot be changed through another rezoning 
has the appearance of contract or contingent zoning. See Saxer, supra note 240, at 62-63. Courts 
generally invalidate contract or contingent zoning on the theory that it is bargaining away police 
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tions to permit commercial use may justify an exaction to support a re-
zoning that would negatively affect the purpose or policy of the earlier 
. . 259 
exception or vanance. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Ehrlich addressed takings issues that clearly illustrate the manner in 
which local and state governments create exactions that compensate for 
an increased burden on the public within the limit imposed by Dolan. 
Ehrlich showed that the use of public value contributions by resident-
benefits that is conferred on commercial land expands the authority to 
impose exactions with a weak connection to development impacts but a 
strong policy connection to a public need. 
Impact exactions finance infrastructure and public facilities. Ehrlich 
stands for the principle that a legitimate state interest includes public 
value that can be lost through a change in land use. The Supreme Court 
of California found that recreational facilities open to the public include 
public value that will permit the loss of these facilities in order to justify 
and relate to an exaction. This court's concept of public value that is de-
rived from a resident-benefit contribution strains jurisprudential and eco-
nomic thinking in Ehrlich. 
We do not argue that Supreme Court of California's concept of pub-
lic value has merit under some circumstances. However, further research 
is needed to determine the nature of public benefits and contributions 
that would justify imposing a mitigation fee for the discontinuance of 
commercial land use that required special government action for contin-
ued use. 
power. See id. Contract or contingent zoning imposes limits on a municipality's power to change 
zoning in the future, id., differs from a development agreement that in some jurisdictions "is a prom-
ise by the municipality to freeze the applicable land use regulatory scheme in return for specified 
performances by the developer. See id. at 62-63 (citing Patricia G. Hamnes, Development Agree-
ments: The Intersection lif Real Estate Finance and Land Use Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119, 
164 (1993)). Few states have enacted statutes that permit development agreements between munici-
palities and developers. !d. at 59-60. 
259. See generally Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 448 (noting that Ehrlich's requests for a rezoning 
would negatively impact the special plan adopted by Culver City to change the use from residential 
to commercial). See id. at 433-34. Culver City had adopted a special plan that permitted the original 
development of the site of Ehrlich's recreational facilities. See id. at 434. 
